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1. INTRODUCTION
I should like to give you a report on “ The State of the First Amend
ment” with particular emphasis on the whole question of editorial
privacy and the protection of confidential news sources; and in order
to do that let me take you back more than 200 years to the middle of
the 18th century, when both the Founders of our nation and citizens in
Britain were chafing at the autocracy of the British Crown, specifi
cally the Crown’s suppression of freedom of expression.
During that period, the main victims of editorial oppression were
printers on both sides of the Atlantic. In order to suppress public
criticism of itself, the Crown had instituted an elaborate censorship
system banning anonymous handbills, licensing all printers and pass
ing criminal sedition and criminal libel laws.
To obtain the information it needed to prosecute both the Colonial
and British press, the Crown made broad use of its warrant powers
whereby officers would break into printers’ shops in Boston and Lon
don, iii New York and Liverpool, in order to discover who was supply
ing the Colonial printers with their editorial content.
Two publishers in Britain were raided, John Entick, a London
printer, and John Wilkes, the editor of the North Britain. Officers of
the Crown rummaged through all of their files in order to find the
sources of their information.
They both filed law suits challenging these surprise raids and in
1765 Lord Chief Justice Camden handed down the opinion in Entick: v.
Carrington and Three Other King’ s Messengers,l which is the great
English common law landmark to our concept of personal privacy
and editorial independence.
The .Lord Chief Justice said: “ Papers are the owner’s goods and
chattels; they are his dearest property and they are so far from en
during a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection; and
though the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass,
yet where private papers are removed and carried away the secret
nature of those goods wall be an aggravation of the trespass, and de
mand more considerable damages in that respect. Where is the
written law' that gives any magistrate such a power? I can safely
answer, there is none; and therefore it is too much for us, without
such authority, to pronounce a practice legal which would be sub
versive of all the comforts of society. ” 2
The warrant against Mr. Wilkes, signed by Lord Halifax, similar
ly authoized a search of the office of “ authors, printers and publishers”
permitting the Crown “ to seize . . . their papers.” 3
The Court of Common Pleas, in awarding Mr. Wilkes damages,
said that this was “ a ridiculous warrant against the Whole English
nation,” and Lord Coke added that is was a practice “ more pernicious
to the innocent than useful to the public.” 4
There is no doubt that every American stateman during our revo
lutionary and constitutional period was familiar with this monument
to freedom.5
The history of the Colonial printers, as Russell Wiggins has pointed
out in his article, was similar to their British brethern. Licensing,
criminal sedition, seditious libel and prior restraints on publication —
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backed up by the hated General Warrant power — were the key tools
used by the Colonial governors against the printers and other critics
of the government.
The List of Infringements and Violations of Rights drawn up by
the Boston town meeting in late 1772, complained that “ our houses
and even our bedchambers are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes,
chests and trunks broken open, ravaged and plundered” by officers of
the Crown armed with warrants.s
And Patrick Henry, in urging protections for individual privacy,
told a meeting in Richmond that under the current law, officers (may)
“ go into your cellars and rooms and search and ransack and mea
sure.” /
When the Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia to
draft the Bill of Rights, the evils of the previous four decades and the
doctrine of Entick v. Carrington were reviewed. There were a num
ber of patterns to be dealt with. Several of these patterns involved
disparate individuals who were oppressed by the Crown. For example,
there was the lawyer in Boston or the merchant in New York or the
planter in Virginia who 'was prosecuted or fined for signing petitions
or speaking out against the Colonial governors. For these individuals,
the Framers of the Constitution established freedom of speech and
the right to petition the government.
And there was the Boston merchant or the Philadelphia tradesman
or the Virginia farmer forced to incriminate himself and denied coun
sel. To correct this problem, the Framers of the Constitution esta
blished the Sixth Amendment.
In addition to individuals oppressed by government, there were two
identifiable institutional groups which had been subjected to continuous
persecution in the preceding 40 years — the religious dissenters and
the Colonial printers. Because the Framers of the Constitution were
so concerned about these two institutions — the church which did not
agree with the Government’s religion and the press which did not
agree with the Government’s politics — the Framers inserted specific
and preferential protections in the First Amendment. They forbid the
state from establishing religion; and they prohibited laws abridging
freedom of the press.
In addition, they passed the Fourth Amendment to limit wholesale
searches of all citizens’ papers; but it is uncontested that the Amend
ment obtained its historical impetus from the searches against the
press. In fact, as both Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Whites
have noted: “ The struggle from which the Fourth Amendment
emerged is largely a history of conflict between the Crown and the
press.”
In short, two of the Bill of Rights were intended to protect the
press: the First Amendment by its specific terms and the Fourth
Amendment by its historical evolution. Both amendments were aimed
at insulating the institutional critics of government — the writers of
handbills, the reporters, editors and publishers of newspapers, the
authors of books — the press as it was constituted in those days.
—

4

2. 1971 — A PIVOTAL YEAR: THE PENTAGON PAPERS
Now, bearing in mind the relative censorship goals of the Colonial
governors and the response envisioned by the Constitution, let us go
forward to the year 1971 which is in many ways a pivotal year for
the situation today.
In June of that year, if you remember, for the first time in United
States’ peacetime history, a newspaper of general circulation was
prohibited by the courts from publishing news. The newspaper was
Tile New York Times. The news was “ The Pentagon Papers.” It
is true that the Supreme Court voided the injunction. But the decision
had three ominous portents.
First: The Supreme Court allowed the injunction to continue for
two weeks. And it was not only against The Times, if you remember,
but it also had the effect of restraining publication by The Washington
Post, The St. Louis Post-Dispatch and The Boston Globe.
Second: The 6 -3 majority decision was two hundred words long
and, far from offering a ringing denunciation of the injunction, was,
at best, a grudging reversal.9
Third: Three Supreme Court Justices, including two now on the
Court, would have continued the injunction.10 Two additional justices,
both now on the Court, voted with the majority but suggested that —
instead — the government could criminally prosecute The Times and
The Post for violating the Espionage Act.11
And Mr. Justice Rehnquist, who is now on the Court, was at that
time an Assistant Attorney General and had advised the government
that it had the power to restrain publicaiton of the Viet Nam study.
Therefore, T think the Pentagon Papers contained implicit mes
sages — that the press was not as free an institution as we thought
it was, independent of the courts; that the press was not immune
from court controls on the content of news, and that despite the word
ing of the First Amendment, that the government shall not abridge
freedom of the press, the Pentagon Papers incident sent word to
judges throughout the land that under some circumstances the courts
may decide what the public is going to read.
In 1971, there were certain other significant legal developments
affecting the press whose future importance was overlooked at the
time. In April of that year, police raided a college newspaper, The
Stanford University Daily in Palo Alto, California, rummaging through
all of its files; and in January of that year the Nixon Administration
had secretly begun to seize the telephone records of news organizations
in an effort to discover their confidential news sources; and we will
return to these two incidents — the Stanford Daily raid and the tele
phone seizures — later.
3. BRANZBURG TO FARBER
Also, in May of 1971, the Supreme Court agreed to review the
decisions of three different appellate courts — from Kentucky, Massa
chusetts and California — which had ruled that the First Amendment
did not protect confidential news sources when reporters were called
to testify before grand juries.
A year later, in June 1972, the Supreme Court decided these three
—
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cases by a 5 - 4 vote 12 and said that reporters could be forced to
testify before grand juries because “ the public interest in law en
forcement” must ‘override” any journalist claim under the First
Amendment. 13 This ruling, said Mr. Justice White, “ involves no
restraint. . . on the type or quality of information reporters may seek
to acquire." 14
Now let me remind you what those three cases were about:
In the federal case, the Justice Department wanted Earl Caldwell
of The New York Times to disclose the specific identity of a single
person in the Black Panther party who allegedly had made a threat
against the life of the President.
Kentucky prosecutors wanted Paul Branzburg of The Louisville
Courier to disclose the specific identity of two or three persons he had
seen making drugs.
Massachusetts prosecutors wanted Paul Pappas to disclose the
specific identity of several armed militants in a storefront office.
In each case, the scope of the information sought was very narrow:
specific persons
The information was apparently important to the
grand jury investigation, and the information was apparently not avail
able from other sources.
This pattern, of only piercing the First Amendment shield for
specific and critical information not available from others, was gen
erally followed by virtually every state and federal court which has
dealt with the more than 50 subpoena cases that have been litigated
in courts of appeal since 1972.15
Peter Bridge of The Newark News, who went to iail,i6 was asked
specifically about some very limited information in a housing scandal.
Will Lewis of KPFA, who went to jail twice, 17 was asked the specific
source of a Symbionese Liberation Army tape. William Farr, 18
then of The Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, who went to jail, was asked
for the specific person who supplied him with information on the
Charles Mans on murder case. Four reporters and editors from the
Fresno, California Bee, all of whom, went to jail, 19 were asked for
the specific source of grand jury information, and so forth.
Now, bearing in mind the specificity of these battles to protect
the First Amendment, let me take you to May 17, 1978. A subpoena
is issued to The New York Times and Mr. Farber for “ all” notes,
“ all” memoranda, “ all” correspondence, “ all” recording of “ all”
interviews with “ all” witnesses for the prosecution and “ all” witnesses
for the defense. It is a witness list that ran to over one hundred per
sons in an investigation which took more than four months.20
This subpoena did not call for the production of a specific docu
ment or even a dozen documents. It called for the production of
more than 5,000 documents — virtually the entire file in this case.
And what was the justification? A single affidavit by the defense
lawyer that, based on his “ information and belief,” something in
those files — and he was not sure what — would be helpful to the de
fense. And so the whole file must be turned over to the judge.
As Justice Marshall noted in his opinion in this case, there really
was no shoving that even a single document was relevant, no less
than thousands of documents.21 So the New York Times subpoena
—
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was extremely broad in its scope. There was no showing that any
thing was critical to the defense and there was no showing that the
information could not have been obtained from other sources. Well,
you know the result — criminal contempt and a $100,000 fine and
civil contempt and $5,000 a day and 40 days in jail.
An by the way, I think it’s important to note here that Mr. Farber
said that if the defense could have shown some strong relevance, if
they could have shown that a document was absolutely critical, he
might have been prepared to deal with them. And of course, the
irony of the whole case was that after a 7 - month trial it took the
jury only 3 hours to acquit the New Jersey physician, which certain
ly shows that the information held by The New York Times was of
no importance to the case.
At this point, persons sometimes ask: “ Well, isn’t there a conflict
between the First Amendment right of a free press and the Sixth
Amendment right of a defendant to obtain evidence in his behalf?”
There are several answers to this query.
First: We in the press argue that we must have confidentiality
in order to do our jobs; that we must be able to assure individual
citizens who come to us with complaints that their identities will not
be revealed. If we are converted into investigative arms of the
courts — and made an appendage of government — citizens will no
longer trust us and will no longer give us information, so that the First
Amendment, if it has any meaning for an independent press, must
mean that we cannot be converted into a government investigative
agency.
There is no doubt that the Framers of the First Amendment in
tended that anonymous sources of information should remain secret
from the government because the Crown’s efforts to identify anony
mous sources of information were one of the prime Colonial censor
ship tools. The Framers were well aware that John Lilburne was
whipped, pilloried and fined for refusing to disclose the identity of
anonymous sources of books and that two Puritan ministers, John
Penry and John Udal, had been sentenced to death when their identi
ties had become known.22
Confidential or anonymous sources of information played a key
role in the Colonial period because the patriots knew that identifying
these sources would subject them to persecution by the government.
The anonymous source of The Letters of Junius is unknown to this
day. Even The Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption
of our Constitution, were signed by fictitious authors.23
Considering the great importance which the Framers of the Con
stitution placed on the protection of confidential or anonymous sources,
it seems inconveivable that the free press guarantee — as interpreted
by the Supreme Court today — should exclude that privilege.
Second: Our argument for the importance of confidentiality is
very similar to the argument of attorneys who state that what is told
to them in confidence by their clients must remain privileged. And
yet, unlike the press guarantee, there is no statement in the Consti
tution that the government shall not abridge the freedom of the legal
profession.
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So this allegedly sacred attorney - client privilege has been con
structed out of whole cloth by the legal profession to protect itself.
It is enforced by judges for their brethern. And yet precisely the
same privilege for the press — even those passed by state law — are
trampled by the courts.
If, in fact, a defendant is deprived of evidence because of a legal
privilege, the courts are free to declare a mistrial. Mistrials are de
clared every day because the defense attorney or the prosecutors
or the judge has permitted evidence to be introduced in violation of
a constitutional or evidentiary rule — such as an invalidly obtained
confession.
But is there an outcry from the legal establishment when one of
their own brothers creates a mistrial? Is the offending judge or
lawyer or prosecutor held in criminal contempt or jailed?
Of course not. But when the evidence to be excluded results
from the assertion of a privilege by the press, for some reason this
evidentiary question becomes a cosmic disaster for the administration
of justice.
Third: Let us compare the relative merits and value to society
of the two privileges. The attorney states he needs a confidentiality
privilege in order to adequately represent a single individual client,
for example, a particular criminal defendant in a mugging case or a
civil plaintiff in an auto accident case.
But the reporter does not assert the privilege for himself or for
any particular individual. He asserts it in order to bring news to the
public. His use of the privilege will benefit thousands, perhaps
millions of readers and other citizens — as in Watergate — because
he brings to them information about government mismanagement or
crime.
Now, I believe there is something morally and constitutionally
askew in the courts when they grant a privilege to protect a plaintiff
in a $200 automobile negligence case but will deny — despite the First
Amendment and even a state shield law — the same type of privilege
to protect the public’s right to known how it is being governed.
4. STANFORD DAILY
Fourteen days after the Farber subpoena was issued, the Supreme
Court decided, in The Stanford Dally case,24 by a 5 - 3 vote, that the
First Amendment does not bar police from making surprise searches
on news rooms and rummaging through the whole office in an effort
to discover a particular document.
Once again ,the court said that the First Amendment protection
for confidential news sources was really no protection at all (and,
by the w7ay; this was the argument put forth by the Carter Adminis
tration, too). Or, as Mr. Justice White said: We are not “ convinced
[today] any more than we were [in 1972] that confidential sources
will disappear and that the press will suppress news because of fears
of warranted searches.” 25
Many people in the press would certainly take issue with Mr.
Justice White’s statement that the impact of a possible search warrant
raid has no chilling effect on the press. Robert Healy, Executive
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Editor of the Boston Globe quite recently gave a dramatic example
of that chilling effect in Congressional testimony. Mr. Healy said:
“ Let me first off read a memo to you from one o f our reporters.
“ ‘Yesterday morning (June 20) I received a call in response to a story
published recently . . . The caller, who did not identify himself and
who was calling from a pay-phone, was seeking further information on
the subject of my story.
“ ‘In the course of oar conversation, it became clear that this person
had information about a significant aspect o f my first story and while
trying to answer his questions in a general way, I pressed him about meet
ing with me . . . The caller said he needed to protect his anonymity and
I assured him I would do my best to preserve it if we met . . . This
morning the same person called, again from a pay-phone . . . the caller
said his superiors had told him that I could not protect his anonymity
because of “ the new law,” which (it became clear) referred to the re
cent Supreme Court ruling that permits issuance of search warrants on
newspaper offiices. Again I told him we would do our best to preserve
his anonymity and after some more conversation about the subject of
my first story and his involvement, the caller said he might call again
some time.’
“ That is the end of the memo. It says more than perhaps anything
I can say about the chilling effect of the Supreme Court’s new de
cision.” 26

Of course, as many of you realize, the great evil of the search
warrant power is its complete lack of notice. The police just appear
at the door and may use any reasonable force in rummaging through
the news office. At least with a subpoena you have the opportunity
to oppose it in court because you have notice; but, as most of you
know, with a search warrant you’re helpless.
Furthermore, the search that the police conduct in looking for this
document is not limited to specific information. They can go — and
have gone — through every file in the office. They do not have to
show on their affidavit that the information sought is critical. All
they are required to show is that there is probable cause to believe
the information would be helpful. And they do not have to show on
their affidavit that the information is not available from other persons.
5. T H E REPORTERS COMMITTEE V. AT&T
Ten weeks later, on August 11, 1978, the United States Court of
Appeals in Washington ruled that, in the hope of discovering some in
formation which might be helpful, the government may secretly seize
up to six months of telephone records of a news organization — and
the home records of journalists, as well — records which show an
hour-by-hour profile of every toll call contact made with every news
source.27
The justification for seizing six months of these telephone records
— and these cases involve the Washington news offices of The St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, The Knight-Ridder Newspapers, The New York Times
and the home telephones of their reporters — was really that the in
formants were giving the press information which was embarrassing
at the time to the Nixon Administration.
—
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So we started out in 1971 trying to protect a specific source or a
specific document of importance. Seven years later we find ourselves
in clear danger of losing every shred of editorial privacy and inde
pendence.
If the courts can authorize a search warrant and go through every
file in your newsroom; if the courts can subpoena your entire file
on a case of thousands of documents, and if the courts can secretly
seize your telephone records, what is left of the concept that the
government shall make no law abridging the freedom of the press?
6. STATE SHIELD LAWS DESTROYED
But there is more to this story. In that 1972 decision in the Branz
burg case, as many of you may remember, Mr. Justice White said
to the press — if you don’t like this ruling, go out and get state shield
laws.
“ There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free . . . to
fashion their own standards . . . with respect to the relations between
law enforcement officials and the press.” 28
Eventually 26 states did have shield laws which in one form or
another protected confidential or unpublished information. 29 And
what has happened? The courts have now started to destroy the
state shield laws by inventing loopholes or simply voiding them.
In California, in the Farr case,30 the courts ruled that the shield
law illegally interfered with the inherent power of the court to en
force a gag order. Again in California, in the Fresno Bee case,3i
the courts ruled that the shield law unconstitutionally interfered with
their inherent power to protec* grand jury secrecy.
In New York, in the Attica prison case, 32 the courts ruled that the
state shield law did not apply if the reporter had witnessed a crime.
In New Jersey, in the Peter Bridge case,33 the courts ruled that the
law was not intended to cover confidential information, but only
sources; in Maryland, in The Baltimore Sun case,34 the courts came
to the opposite conclusion and said the shield law was intended to
cover confidential information but not sources; and similar judicial
destruction of state shield laws has occurred in Tennessee, New
Mexico and Michigan.
And then we have the New Jersey case, involving Myron Farber
and The New York Times, where the court ruled that the state shield
law can be voided any time a criminal defendant can allege that
there may be something useful in a reporter’s file.
7. SECRECY IN THE COURTS
There is another pattern developing in the courts which poses
ironic contradictions. For while judges, on the one hand, are moving
to restrict the news media’s protection of its information, they are
also moving, on the other hand, to insulate themselves from press
investigation and public comment.
As many of you know, in 1976, the Supreme Court ruled in the
Nebraska Press Assoeiaiion case 35 that the courts could not stop
you from publishing news obtained in open court. Well, some courts
had already said to themselves, in effect: “ You fellows in the press
—
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can’t publish what you can’t get.” And they started issuing orders
sealing proceedings, sealing documents and prohibiting participants
from talking to the press.
I can go down a long line of cases of judicially imposed secrecy
on what we in the press thought were public court proceedings, such
as sealing all records of all cases filed in a court of public record,36
hearing secret witnesses,37 sealing off an entire criminal trial and
even,38 here in Maine, requiring reporters to sign an agreement not
to report parts of a public court proceeding as a condition for ad
mittance into a courtroom.39
But the two cases that should interest you most are now pending
before the U. S. Supreme Court from the New York Court of Appeals,40
which is the highest court in New York, and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. 41
These two decisions would permit judges to seal pre-trial pro
ceedings any time the judge, virtually in his own discretion, thinks
that information from the proceedings might prejudice the defendant’ s
right to a fair trial.
This type of censorship of court proceedings contains two inter
related dangers.
First: I should like you to remember that 89% of all indictments
in this country are settled in pre-trial proceedings.42 So that if
judges can seal pre-trial proceedings virtually at will, they can seal
off from controversy and comment their own action in 89% of the
cases in the criminal justice system.
Second: Local judges and prosecutors are an integral part of the
partisan political process.43 They are appointed or elected, gen
erally with support from the local political party, and they may even
run on the same ticket. To permit wholesale sealing of criminal
justice proceedings will insulate prosecutors and judges from any
meaningful accountability to the electorate.44
8. CONCLUSION
In 1973, I and a number of reporters, editors and publishers issued
warnings to press organizations that a confrontation was developing
between the courts and the press and urging reason and moderation.
I think the press has tried to be reasonable and moderate.
There have been a series of in-depth studies and discussions by
all sides, including reports by a committee of the American Bar As
sociation (the Reardon report), a special committee of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York (the Medina report), the American
Nev/spaper Publishers Association, and a committee of the Judicial
Conference of the United States.45 in addition, there have been a
plethora of law review articles, 23 state voluntary bench-bar-press
agreements46 and thousands of dollars and man-hours spent by news
media representatives, judges, and lawyers attending dozens of statebench-bar-press conferences and scores of privately sponsored semi
nars every year.
And what has been the result of all this reason and moderation?
The courts have authorized the police to search our newsrooms. They
have permitted thousands of our private memoranda and files to be
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subpoenaed en masse and our telephone records to be secretly seized.
They have destroyed our journalist privilege laws. They have at
tempted to make our voluntary guidelines mandatory. They have
sent our reporters to jail. They have held our editors in contempt.
They have fined our publishers. And at the same time they are try
ing to prohibit news about themselves from being given to the public.
The conclusion seems clear: We are developing a state of mind
in the judiciary of this nation which believes it is above the law and
the Constitution. And I think the time has come for the press to
stop being moderate and reasonable — to look back to the response
of our Colonial ancestors in the press — and to fight back with every
tool at our disposal.
First and foremost I suppose this means that — as Kathairne
Graham of The Washington Post has said recently — we cannot be
come discouraged to the point where we begin “ to pull back” and to
“ abandon some stories” and to engage in self-censorship in order to
avoid subpoenaes or other types of litigation.47 This determination
means that publishers must be prepared to spend money for adequate
legal representation; and that, in fact — given the volume of these
threats — legal representation on First Amendment questions must
be considered just as much a part of a news organization’s budget as
printing costs and employee salaries.
It must be made perfectly clear to the courts that we will oppose
these threats by appealing and by writing news stories about the
situation in an attempt to inform the public as to how their rights are
being restricted.
But there is perhaps another solution, too. Until now we have
played this game and fought this battle on the turf of the judges, in
their courtrooms where they have the last word. Perhaps we should
start thinking more about fighting on our own turf — the area of
public opinion and the legislative process.
There are already, as you may know, 13 bills in Congress to re
verse the Stanford Daily decision. The American Newspaper Pub
lishers Association, The American Society of Newspaper Editors, The
Reporters Committee and several other organizations have testified
in favor of such legislation.
Now I know that there are some members of the press who feel it
is inappropriate or dangerous to seek legislative relief. They argue
that what Congress can give in terms of First Amendment-type pro
tections, Congress could take away.
I don’t have time to answer this argument in detail except to
point out that, if this argument was in fact valid, women and civil
rights organizations certainly would never have asked for additional
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment for rights to vote or
rights to equal job opportunities. I think the short answer is, how
could Congress take away a protection the courts say we don’t have
anyway? Therefore, Congressional actions could only be an improve
ment over the current situation.
In fact, something must be done and quickly to bring the courts
back under control and the legislative solution is a traditional route to
redress grievances. We find ourselves really in the position of others
—
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who in the past have lost battles in the courts — the people who opposed
abortion, the people who opposed busing and even the publishers who
supported failing newspapers.
Each one of those lost in the Supreme Court and turned to the
Legislative Branch for some type of relief, because that’s the kind
of checks and balances our system allows. When citizens lose in one
Branch, they can go to the other Branch.
I started off this presentation by discussing the censorship efforts
of the British Crown and the Constitutional response, moved forward
182 years to the year 1971 because it appears to be a watershed year
in our views of press freedom, and then moved ahead to survey in
some detail the last 7 years.
It is certainly true that the press and the government have changed
since the mid-18th century. Neither Madison nor Hamilton, who
clashed repeatedly on the free press guarantee, could have envisioned
the press we have today — with computer and satellite technology,
with the great international press associations and the startling de
velopment of television news.
Nor could the Framers of the Constitution have foreseen the great
changes in federal and state government, from small offices dealing
primarily with a rural constituency and a sparsely populated agrarian
society to the enormous technocracies of today guiding the lives of
great metropolitan populations.
But despite these vast changes in the procedures of the press and
the government — in the mechanics of the press bringing the news to
the public and the mechanics of the government providing services to
society — the principles of the First Amendment remain the same;
and those principles are that the government shall not use its powers
to intimidate, harass or regulate the press; and that su ch regulation
w hich is permitted is well-defined and narrow, such as the laws of
libel or a clear and present danger to the national security48 of our
nation. 49
What I should like to argue to you now is that in fact we are facing
the most serious censorship threat to the press within recent memory.
Unlike the 18th century, we have no criminal libel, nor do we have a
John Lilburne whipped and pilloried for refushing o disclose the source
of printed material. What we have instead is the wholesale seizure
of private notes and memoranda by court subpoena. Today there is
no Crown licensing of the press. What we have instead is secret
government inspection of news office telephone files. Today we have
no criminal sedition prosecutions or high sheriffs with general war
rants. What we have instead are surprise search warrant raids and
rummaging almost as broad as the Colonial warrants.
In fact, as the mechanisms of government have changed, as the
mechanisms of the press have changed, so the mechanisms of censor
ship have changed. But the effect and goals of the judicial censors
today are precisely the same as the goals of the Colonial governors —
to harass, to intimidate and to regulate the press in the free exercise
of the printed and broadcast word.
Well, what is the state of the First Amendment regarding the in
dependence of the press, particularly its ability to protect its un
—
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published information? I don’t think there is any doubt that it is
under a most sustained attack and that we have, in fact, lost sub
stantial ground since 1971. I think that recent developments are under
mining its vitality and that we in the press have no choice, as uncom
fortable as this may be, but to fight back.
Thank you.
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APPENDIX A
STATE SHIELD LAWS
Ala. Code tit. 12, $12-21-142 (1975)
Alaska Stat. §09.25.150 (1973)
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §12-2237 (W est Supp. 1977)
Ark. Stat. Ann. §43-917 (1964)
Cal. Evid Code §1079 (Deering Supp. 1978)
Del. Code tit. 10, §§4320-4326 (1974)
Guam Code Civ. Pro. §1882 (
)
111. Ann Stat. ch. 51, §§111-119 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1978)
Ind. Code Ann. §34-3-5-1 (Burns Cum. Supp. 19761
Kv. Rev. Stat. Ann. §421.100 (Baldwin 1977)
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §45:1451-1454 (W est Cum. Supp. 1978)
M d. Cts. and Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §9-112 (1974)
Mich. Stat. Ann. §28.945(1) (1972)
Minn. Stat. Ann. ^595.021 -.025 (W est Cum. Supp. 1977)
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §93-601-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977)
Neb. Rev. Stat. §*20-144 to -147 (1977)
Nev. Rev. Stat. §49.275 (1977)
N. J. Stat. Ann. §2A:84A-21 to -29 (W est Cum. Supp. 1978)
N. M . Stat. Ann.' §20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975)
N.Y. Civ. Rights Laws §79-h (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977)
N. D. Cent. Code §31-01-06.2 (1976)
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2739.12 (Page 1953)
Okla. Stat. tit. 12, §§385.1-3 (Cum. Supp. 1977)
Or. Rev. Stat. §44.510-.540 (1977)
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, §330 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978)
R. I. Gen. Laws §9-19.1-1 to -3 (Cum. Supp 1977)
Tenn. Code Ann §24-113 (Cum. Supp. 1977)
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J e f f Beebe
F o r t h e MPA
Board of D i r e c t o r s

S in cerely ,

On b e h a l f o f t h e Maine P r e s s A s s o c i a t i o n , I am
e n c l o s i n g two c o p i e s o f t h e t e x t o f a s p e e c h p r e s e n t e d
by J a c k L a n d a u , d i r e c t o r of t h e R e p o r t e r s Committee f o r
t h e Freedom of t h e P r e s s , a t Colby C o l l e g e . The MPA Board
of D i r e c t o r s , a t our l a s t m e e tin g , d e c id e d to d i s t r i b u t e
t h e s p e e c h t o a l l Maine n e w s p a p e r s and o t h e r p a r t i e s . We
hope you f i n d Mr. L a n d a u ’ s comments i n t e r e s t i n g .
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